Home/Table of Contents
Current Client - Part I

       Union Organization; Who's the Client?   Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Int’l Assoc. of the United States and Canada, Local 222 v. Alberta, 2008 ABQB 225 (CanLII) (Alberta Ct. Q. B. April 16, 2008).  Only the local involved.       

        Donaldson v. City of Walterboro Police Dept., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26801 (D.S.C. March 31, 2008).  The court applied Rule 1.7 as written and disqualified law firm.

        Post-Estate Planning Ministerial Work not Current Representation.  Yang Enterprises, Inc. v. Yang, 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 11865 (Fla. App. Aug. 7, 2008).  This is an unremarkable opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify.  The movant had waited years to make the motion.  While the decision was based largely on a waiver by passage of time, the court made this interesting statement as to whether the client was current or former:

Petitioners argued below that they are current clients of Broad and Cassel and relied primarily on two cover letters sent from a paralegal in Broad and Cassel's Orlando office in 2004 and a paralegal's bill for minor changes to their estate file in 2007. None of these acts indicated a continuing legal representation, but rather they were ministerial tasks performed to update the completed estate planning documents.

        Hill v. Hunt, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68925 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2008).  In this opinion the court granted a motion to disqualify the plaintiff’s law firm, Bickel & Brewer (“B&B”).  This suit involves allegations of mismanagement of two Hunt family trusts.  Two issues were whether B&B currently represented one of the defendants or whether B&B had formerly represented that defendant.  This decision is very fact intensive and, as far as we can tell, has no precedential value.  But, it is interesting.  Some of the factors discussed include who paid what fees, what bills were sent to whom, the significance of E-mails, the significance of who appeared at what meetings and what was discussed at the meetings, who sought legal advice, who directed the activities of B&B, and so forth.  The court frequently used the term “appearance of impropriety,” even though both the ABA Model Rules and the Texas rules dropped that expression when they were adopted.  The court did not discuss the fact that Texas is the only state whose version of Model Rule 1.7 allows a lawyer to represent a client on one matter and be adverse to that client on an unrelated matter, but the court did acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit in both American Airlines and Dresser Industries held that the ABA rules, and not the Texas rules, would apply in this context in the Fifth Circuit.  That distinction would not have changed the result in this case because the court held that the matters in question were related.

        Goodman v. Goodman, 2008 Mo. App. LEXIS 1375 (Mo. App. Oct. 7, 2008).  Husband and Wife met with Lawyer to discuss a divorce.  Lawyer was married to Husband's mother.  As a result of the meeting Lawyer prepared a petition for dissolution, in which Wife was petitioner and Lawyer was Wife's lawyer.  Wife never signed the petition, and it was never filed.  Husband then hired another lawyer who filed a petition for Husband (this case).  Before trial of this case Lawyer appeared for Husband.  Wife moved to disqualify Lawyer, which the trial court denied.  In this opinion the appellate court affirmed.  The court said that the result would be the same whether Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 applied because, in either case, Wife was not able to show that the conflict did "clearly call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice."  Among other things the court noted that Wife never met separately with Lawyer, except for a phone call to schedule a meeting during which she indicated she might go see another lawyer.

        Styles v. Mumbert, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (Cal. App. 2008).  Creditor sued Debtor.  Lawyer represented Debtor.  After default judgment, and during pendency of an appeal of the default, Debtor sued Lawyer for malpractice, and Lawyer counterclaimed for fees.  Lawyer then purchased Creditor's judgment (judgment assigned) and sought leave to substitute for Creditor in the appeal of the default.  In this opinion the appellate court held that Lawyer had a serious conflict and should not be allowed to substitute.  The court stressed Lawyer's duty of confidentiality to Debtor.

        Avink v. SMG, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 97 (Mich. App. Jan. 20, 2009).  A door panel fell on Plaintiff's decedent, killing him.  Plaintiff sued the general manager ("Manager") of the property and several companies associated with manufacturing and selling the door.  The defendants included Overhead Door, which had installed the door.  Manager filed a cross-claim against Overhead Door.  Manager moved to disqualify Overhead Door's law firm ("Law Firm") because Law Firm was currently representing Manager in a different injury case.  The trial court denied the motion.  In this opinion, the appellate court reversed.  The court spent some time on what is direct adversity.  It also said that the fact that different lawyers at Law Firm worked on the two matters would not affect the outcome, noting that screens only work in the context of former clients.

        Waiver as to Unrelated Matter; Standing (posted February 21, 2009) Camel v. Nijjar, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 269 (N.Y. Misc. Feb. 11, 2009).  Auto accident case.  The plaintiff sued two individuals and two companies.  The plaintiff's lawyer ("Lawyer") is also representing one of the individual defendants ("Agins") in an unrelated workers' compensation matter.  Two other defendants moved to disqualify Lawyer.  In this opinion the court denied the motion because Agins and the plaintiff had waived the conflict, and because the moving defendants did not have standing to make the motion.

        Owning and Representing Competing Business.  Florida Bar v. Herman, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 244 (Fla. Feb. 19, 2009).  Disciplinary proceeding.  While representing Company A Lawyer established a competing Company B.  Lawyer represented Company B and ultimately became sole owner of Company B.  Lawyer never disclosed his interest in Company B to the owner of Company A.  In this opinion the court found that Lawyer violated Florida's versions of Model Rules 1.7(a)(1), 1.8(a), and 8.4(c).  As to 1.7, the court said that it does not just apply in litigation.  What Lawyer did was directly adverse to his client, Company A.  As to 1.8(a), the court applied the second prong of the rule about acquiring an interest adverse to a client.  As to 8.4(c), the court said that Lawyer's failure to request Company A's consent to his competing business was deceitful.  The bottom line: Lawyer was suspended for 18 months.

        Palgut v. City of Colorado Springs, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21698 (D. Col. Mr. 3, 2009).  This opinion involves a motion to withdraw by the plaintiff's law firm because the plaintiff had stopped paying fees.  During a hearing on the motion an expert witness for the plaintiff testified that the law firm should not be permitted to withdraw because there was a "genuine dispute" between the plaintiff and her law firm over the propriety of the fees it was charging.  After that testimony the law firm amended its motion to withdraw claiming that the negative testimony by the expert created a conflict between the plaintiff and her law firm.  In this opinion the court denied the motion to withdraw, saying, in part, that a fee dispute does not automatically constitute a conflict of interest.

        Hillis v. Heineman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29914 (D. Ariz. Mr. 25, 2009).  Plaintiff sued the defendants and their lawyer ("Lawyer") for fraud and related causes of action.  Lawyer appeared for all defendants, including himself.  Plaintiff moved to disqualify Lawyer because he should be a witness.  The court denied the motion without prejudice because it was not yet clear whether Lawyer should be a witness.  What the court did not mention, and what the parties apparently did not raise, was the propriety of Lawyer defending himself as well as the other defendants, especially in light of Lawyer's having earlier represented the company involved in the case.

        Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Al-Mashhadi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75442 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2009).  An employee at a filling station ("Employee"), at about the time he was getting off work, was horsing around with a rifle owned by the filling station.  The rifle accidentally discharged injuring a friend of Employee ("Friend").  Friend sued the filling station and several individuals, including Employee, in state court.  The plaintiff in this case ("EMC") issued an insurance policy covering the filling station for liability.  EMC is seeking in this case a declaration that its policy does not cover the shooting accident.  The law firm representing EMC in this case ("Law Firm") also represents the filling station and individual defendants in the state court case.  However, EMC retained a different law firm to represent Employee in the state court case.  Employee moved to disqualify Law Firm in this case.  In this opinion the court denied the motion, finding no conflict of interest.

        Merck Eprova AG v. Pro Thera, Inc., 2009 WL 4067209 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2009).  Patent infringement action.  For a time Law Firm was representing Merck as co-counsel in a patent prosecution while representing Pro Thera in this case.  The prosecution matter involved some of the same chemicals that are involved in this case.  Those relationships caused Merck to file a disqualification motion against Law Firm in this case.  The motion was filed after Merck had changed counsel in the prosecution matter.  In this opinion the magistrate judge granted the motion.  The judge treated the conflict as a current-client conflict, following those decisions that said that the situation had to be judged as of the time of the conflict, rather than at the time the motion was filed.

        Encompass Holdings Inc. v. Daly, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93197 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009).  Court enforces current client rule under California Rule 3-310(C).

        National Envelope Corp. v. American Pad & Paper LLC, No. 06 Civ. 12988 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2009).  Law Firm represents the plaintiff in this matter.  Intervenor, not a party to this case, has moved to disqualify Law Firm because Law Firm represents Intervenor in another matter not related to this case.  Intervenor evidently claims that Law Firm's position in this case may affect Intervenor adversely in yet another case in which Law Firm is not involved.  In this opinion the district judge has affirmed the order of the magistrate judge denying the motion.

        Lincoln Associates & Construction, Inc. v. Wentworth Construction Co., Inc., 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 121 (Fla. App. Jan. 12, 2010).  In a current client situation the trial court denied a motion to disqualify because the conflict was not "material."  In this opinion the appellate court reversed, holding that materiality has nothing to do with it.

        Feld v. Feld, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4743 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2010).  This is an action by a beneficiary of a trust to remove the trustee.  In this opinion the court held that the lawyer for the trustee could stay in this case even though that lawyer also represented the trustee in his personal capacity in another suit by the beneficiary, and even though the lawyer also represented some of the trustee's children.

        Bals v. Metedeconk Nat'l Golf Club, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32557 (D.N.J. March 31, 2010).  In this case Plaintiff sued Golf Club, Plaintiff's former employer, for age discrimination.  Law Firm represented Plaintiff.  A senior partner at Law Firm was on the board of Golf Club when Plaintiff was hired.  The senior partner and Plaintiff became friends, but, evidently, the senior partner while on the board of the Golf Club was not privy to any of the facts relevant to this case.  The senior partner turned this case over to another partner to handle.  Golf Club moved to disqualify Law Firm.  In this opinion the magistrate judge denied the motion.  First, she found no current-client or former-client conflict because neither the senior partner nor Law Firm had ever represented Golf Club.  Second, she found that under Rule 1.10 whatever personal interest the senior partner had in Plaintiff or Golf Club was not imputed to the partner handling the case.  Last, the judge found that Law Firm was not in violation of the lawyer-as-witness rule.

        Marks Constr. Co., Inc. v. The Huntington Nat'l Bank, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32998 (N.D. W. Va. April 2, 2010).  This is an action by ERISA plan fiduciaries and participants against plan administrators.  The defendants moved to disqualify the law firm representing all the plaintiffs because there was a conflict between the plaintiff/fiduciaries on the one hand and the plaintiff/participants on the other.  The court found there was no conflict based upon somewhat arcane ERISA law principles.  (If you do ERISA litigation, you might want to read the opinion.)  The court also found that a four-year delay in bringing the motion was grounds, alone, to deny the motion.  Last, the court held that the conflict, if any, was waivable, and that the plaintiffs had proven to the court's satisfaction that there was a waiver.

        In re Savin, 2010 Minn. LEXIS 185 (Minn. April 7, 2010).  In this one-page opinion, containing no background, the court publicly reprimanded Lawyer for having a "1.7" "directly adverse" conflict of interest.  We got hold of the disciplinary authority's petition.  This is a crude attempt to summarize the allegations.  Lawyer represented a business person in setting up a joint venture to develop real estate.  This would be the same real estate the county planned to use for a baseball stadium.  Lawyer's partners, the county's bond counsel, represented the county in obtaining legislation authorizing the purchase of the land.

        California Earthquake Auth. v. Metropolitan West Securities, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44016 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2010).  In 2002 Law Firm and a state agency ("Agency") entered into a written retainer agreement.  Among other things, the agreement provided that Law Firm would have to give Agency thirty days written notice if it intended to terminate the relationship.  Law Firm did three hours work for the Agency during 2002 and did no work for Agency after that.  Law Firm never gave Agency written notice of termination.  In 2009 Law Firm appeared for the defendant in this case adverse to Agency.  Agency moved to disqualify Law Firm, and in this opinion the court granted the motion.  Basically, the court said that the absence of written notice of termination meant that Agency was a current client of Law Firm.  The court further said that written contracts between lawyers and clients should be "read expansively and not parsed to favor the lawyer."

        Filippi v. Elmont Union Free School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2010 U.S. Dist. 66352 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2010).  This is an employment-related action against a school board and several of its administrators.  An associate at the plaintiff's law firm ("Law Firm") is a member of the school board.  For this reason the defendants moved to disqualify Law Firm.  In this opinion the court granted the motion.  First, the court held that there was a conflict under N.Y. Rule 1.7(a)(1).  Second, although Law Firm screened the board member from this case, the court held that Law Firm was too small for the screen to be trusted.  Although the board had initially approved of the board member joining Law Firm, the court held that there should have been a written waiver.  The court also expressed doubts about whether the conflict was waivable.  The court also discussed N.Y. Rule 1.11, saying that the rule offered no help to Law Firm.  Last, the court found an "appearance of impropriety."

        Robinson v. State of New York, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70715 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010).  This is an employment discrimination case against the state.  The plaintiff moved to disqualify the N.Y. Attorney General ("AG") from representing the defendants in this case because the AG is also, in another case, defending an action in which one of the defendants in this case is the plaintiff.  In this opinion the magistrate judge denied the motion, relying primarily on the fact that different personnel in the AG's office are handling the two matters and the AG's office promised to set up a screen between the teams of lawyers.

        North Carolina State Bar v. Sossomon, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 1768 (N.C. App. Sept. 7, 2010).   Discipline.  Fact-specific.  Complex.  Lawyer was suspended for one year for being insensitive to conflict and confidentiality rules.  If you want to know how not to handle the sale and resale of undeveloped real estate, read the opinion.

        Dimenco v. Service Empoyees Int'l Union, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4068 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011).  The court held that where a law firm is adverse to a labor union in an NLRB certification proceeding, that law firm is disqualified from bringing an action for several union members on behalf of that union.

        “Framework” Retainer Agreements.  Banning Ranch Conservancy v. Superior Court, No. G044223 (Cal. App. March 22, 2011).  Banning Ranch sued City to prevent City from building a highway on the ranch.  City moved to disqualify the ranch's law firm ("Law Firm") because City was a  current client of Law Firm on other matters.  In fact, Law Firm had done no work for City for about five years.  The City pointed to its written retainer agreement (actually, there were two) with Law Firm, which contemplated that the terms of the agreement (fees, etc.) would remain in force for each new matter that Law Firm handled for City.  The appellate court termed the agreement a "framework" agreement.  The trial court granted the motion to disqualify.  In this opinion the appellate court reversed (granted writ of mandate).  The court, in construing the "framework" agreement as a matter of contract law, held that the agreement did not extend out the lawyer-client relationship beyond the rendering of the services Law Firm performed for City.

        Alayoff v. Alayoff, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1957 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 27, 2011).  Daughter sued Father over a property dispute.  Daughter moved to disqualify Father's lawyer, alleging that she is a former client of the lawyer.  In this opinion the court denied the motion.  Daughter offered no specific evidence that she was a client, stating merely that the lawyer was a "family attorney" for many years.  That, the court said, was not enough.

        Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46237 (S.D. Cal. April 29, 2011).  Law Firm represents the plaintiff in this patent infringement case.  Direct TV, a non-party, sought leave to intervene and disqualify Law Firm, because Law Firm represented Direct TV in other matters.  Direct TV claimed that this case was antagonistic to its interests in other patent cases, in which Law Firm was not involved.  In this opinion the court denied the motion to disqualify.  The court noted two similar cases with different results: Rembrandt Techs. LP v. Comcast Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2007) (finding disqualification); and Enzo Biochem. v. Applera Corp., 468 F. Supp. 2d 359 (D. Conn. 2007) (finding no disqualification).  The court found the latter more compelling in this circumstance.

        Process Controls Int'l, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49876 (E.D. Mo. May 10, 2011).  For part of the time this case was pending, a lawyer ("Lawyer") in Defendant's law firm ("Law Firm") did work for Plaintiff unrelated to this case.  Because of this work, Plaintiff moved to disqualify Law Firm.  In this opinion the court granted the motion.  The court said that disqualification was appropriate even if Lawyer's work for Plaintiff consisted of short, "self-contained" assignments that had ended by the time of the motion.  The fact that this work occurred during the pendency of this case was determinative.

        Ramos v. Quien, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64871 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2011).  This is a medical malpractice case against several medical providers.  Pursuant to a local ADR rule the case went to arbitration.  The arbitration award found for the plaintiff against one doctor but against the plaintiff as to the other providers.  Pursuant to the local rule the first doctor moved for a trial de novo.  That meant that all the defendants had to stand trial.  Lawyer, who moved for the trial de novo, appeared for all defendants.  The plaintiff moved to disqualify Lawyer.  In this opinion the court denied the motion.

        Wink, Inc. v. Wink Threading Studio, Inc., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 82379 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2011).  Trademark infringement action and issue of willfulness.  The defendant claims its actions were not willful because it relied on an opinion of a lawyer ("Payne").  Payne was deposed and testified that he advised the defendant that its trademark was "problematic."  Owners of the defendant testified that Payne told them the trademark was not a problem.  The same two lawyers ("Lawyers") represented both the defendant and Payne.  The plaintiff moved to disqualify Lawyers.  In this opinion the magistrate judge granted the motion.

        In re Stephenson, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 880 (Ill. App. Aug. 12, 2011).  Pay close attention.  This is complicated.  Divorce case.  W hired Elizabeth Wakeman to represent her and file a petition for dissolution.  H hired Paulette Gray to defend and counterclaim.  Paulette was married to Robert Gray.  Robert Gray was a member of the Gummerson Rausch law firm.  Later Mark Gummerson, of Gummerson Rausch, sought leave to become additional counsel for W.  H objected and moved to disqualify Gummerson.  Two troublesome conversations had taken place, leading to the motion to disqualify.  First, Paulette, H's lawyer, had discussed the case with her husband Robert, who was the partner of Mark Gummerson (who was seeking to become W's lawyer).  Second, Paulette had a discussion with Mark Gummerson, himself, at the court house about the foibles of practicing in that county.  The trial court disqualified Gummerson.  In this opinion the appellate court reversed.  First, the court held that H had never become a client of the Gummerson Rausch firm because of those conversations.  Thus, this could not be a current client conflict, or, for that matter, a former client conflict.  The court relied on agency law and implied authority concepts to an extent not usually seen in conflict-of-interest cases.  Second, the court felt that no sensitive information had gotten through to Mark Gummerson.  Third, the court noted approvingly that the Gummerson Rausch firm had erected a screen between its partner, Robert, and the rest of the firm.

        Stewart v. VCU Health System Auth., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95407 (E.D. Va. Aug. 25, 2011).  The plaintiff wrote a letter to the court complaining that the plaintiff's lawyer ("Lawyer") had committed various frauds and other types of professional misconduct.  The court granted Lawyer's motion to withdraw.  The plaintiff then moved the court to reconsider the order allowing withdrawal.  In this opinion the court denied the motion to reconsider.  The court said that withdrawal was compelled by the material limitation provision in Virginia Rule 1.7(a)(2).

        Conflict before IRS.  Harbin v. Commissioner, 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 39 (U.S. Tax Ct. Sept. 26, 2011).  H and W were going through a divorce.  Lawyer represented both.  After the IRS declared a deficiencies against both H and W, H filed for relief from joint and several liability.  Lawyer had represented both H and W before the IRS.  Because of Lawyer's conflict of interest, the Tax Court, in this opinion, ruled that H should obtain relief from joint and several liability.

        Discipline.  In re Ferraro, 2011 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8594 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 29, 2011.  Lawyer represented a decedent's estate in the sale of Parcel No. 1.  Lawyer did not inform the executor that the broker in the transaction, who had recommended Lawyer, was the principal of Buyer.  Lawyer also failed to inform the executor that Lawyer was representing Buyer in the transaction.  Lawyer also represented Buyer in the purchase of Parcel No. 2, which was contiguous to Parcel No. 1.  Lawyer represented Buyer in selling Parcel No. 1 to another company for more money than Buyer was paying the estate.  This resale of Parcel No. 1 was contingent upon the conclusion of the sale of Parcel No. 2.  None of this was disclosed to the executor.  In this opinion the court held that Lawyer should be suspended for two years.

        Little Italy Dev. LLC v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138335 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2011).  Law Firm did work for Title Co.  While still doing work for Title Co., Law Firm got into a coverage argument with Title Co. on behalf of another client.  After Law Firm's work for Title Co. ceased, Law Firm filed this action over the aforesaid coverage issue.  In this opinion, in a fact-intensive analysis, the court granted a motion to disqualify Law Firm.  [Note: the court relied substantially upon Carnegie Cos., Inc. v. Summit Props., Inc., 918 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio App. 2009), a case we have always felt exemplified the kind of analysis a court should make under modern conflict rules.]

         Withdrawal Denied.  Alzheimer's Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140345 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2011).  Law Firm represents the plaintiff in this patent infringement case.  When Intervenor sought to intervene adversely to the plaintiff, Law Firm, in a conflicts check, discovered it represented Intervenor in unrelated matters.  Because of this conflict, Law Firm then sought to withdraw from this case.  In this opinion the court denied the motion.  The court held that Pennsylvania's Rule 1.16(c) trumps the current client provisions contained in Rule 1.7.  The court applied a balancing test, holding, in effect that the prejudice to the plaintiff if Law Firm withdrew would outweigh any harm to Intervenor if withdrawal was denied.  The court also mentioned the disruption to the court's docket if Law Firm were to withdraw.  The Federal Circuit affirmed at In re University of So. Fla. Bd. of Trustees, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 821 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2012).  In a somewhat related case a magistrate judge in Alzheimer's Inst. of Am. v. Elan Corp PLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147471 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011) refused to allow Law Firm to withdraw for much the same reason as the court gave in the Pennsylvania case.

        Feingold v. Liberty Mut. Group, 2011 U.S. Dist. 140336 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011).  This is a bad faith claim against InsCo.  In the underlying state court case Lawyer, an employee of InsCo, appeared for InsCo, adversely to the plaintiff.  Lawyer is now in the law firm representing InsCo ("Law Firm"), but is not one of the lawyers of record.  The plaintiff moved to disqualify Law Firm.  In this opinion the court denied the motion.  The court said that Lawyer's relationship to the plaintiff in state court was plainly arms-length and adversarial.  Thus, no conflict in this case.

        In re McElroy, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5913 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2011).  Law Firm represented Incompetent.  Law Firm also represented Executor of the estate of Incompetent's mother and is moving for probate of the will.  Under the will Incompetent would receive less than she would have intestate.  Claiming that Law Firm had a conflict, GAL, on behalf of Incompetent, moved to disqualify Law Firm.  In this opinion the court granted the motion.

        Discipline.  People v. Johnson, 2011 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 83 (Col. Dec. 13, 2011).  In this one-paragraph order Lawyer was suspended for thirty days solely (apparently) for representing a corporation and suing it at the same time.

        Gill v. Bischoff, 2011 Guam LEXIS 23 (Guam Dec. 20, 2011).  X entered into a contract with Lawyer, which provided in part for legal services.  X filed for bankruptcy.  Y claims he succeeded to the rights of X under the contract.  Lawyer refused to work for Y, and Y filed this case against Lawyer.  The trial court dismissed the complaint.  In this opinion the supreme court affirmed, holding that a contractual right to legal services is not assignable; both the client and the lawyer must agree for the relationship to continue.  Moreover, in this case, proceeding on behalf of Y would have put Lawyer in conflict with other clients.

        Discipline.  In re Kalla, 2012 Minn. LEXIS 4 (Minn. Jan. 25, 2012).  This is one of those rare disciplinary decisions based solely on a conflict of interest.  The lawyer was given a public reprimand and put on two years supervised probation.

        Cameron v. Rohn, 2012 U.S. Dist. 12381 (D.V.I. Jan. 30, 2012).  Lawyers A and B were partners in Firm AB.  A left Firm AB and is now suing Firm AB and B.  The only count against Firm AB alleges that it discriminated against A.  There other counts against B related to control of law firm property and the like.  B's new law firm, BC, has appeared in this case for Firm AB.  A moved to disqualify Firm BC and B, and the magistrate judge granted the motion.  In this opinion the district judge reversed holding that B and Firm BC would have no motive to favor themselves over Firm AB in the discrimination count.

        Krutzfeldt Ranch, LLC v. Pinnacle Bank, 2012 Mont. LEXIS 15 (Mont. Jan. 31, 2012).  In this case Borrowers sued Bank for breach of a loan agreement.  Borrowers' lawyer retained Tax Lawyer to advise Borrowers on how to structure a possible settlement.  Without warning to Borrowers, Tax Lawyer joined the law firm representing Bank ("Bank Firm").  When Borrowers received an announcement of this change, they immediately moved to disqualify Bank Firm.  The trial court denied the motion, holding that Borrowers were former clients of Tax Lawyer and that Bank Firm's screen of Tax Lawyer prevented Bank Firm's disqualification.  In this opinion the supreme court reversed.  After analyzing what transpired when Tax Lawyer joined Bank Firm, the court concluded that the Borrowers remained clients when the move occurred.  Thus, Bank Firm's disqualification became automatic.  The court also added that even under a former client analysis, the screen erected by Bank Firm was not timely.

Home/Table of Contents
Current Client - Part I